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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Jobs are contracts.  Or, to put it more precisely: the employment 
relationship finds its legal representation in a contract.  The decision to 
provide labor on behalf of another person or organization is legally 
cemented through the creation of an agreement that is express or implied, 
oral or written, term or at-will.  The role of contract, however, is often 
overlooked in the world of labor and employment law.  The basic 
employment agreement has been layered over with a dizzying variety of 
federal and state statutes that impose specific responsibilities on the parties.  
As recent legislative efforts such as California A.B. 51 have made even 
clearer, the parties do not choose whether the relationship is characterized 
as employment or not; the characterization is based on the relationship’s 
structure.  Employment has moved closer towards becoming a status—a set 
of legal obligations that come with a particular role, rather than obligations 
 
* Callis Family Professor and Co-Director, Wefel Center for Employment Law, Saint Louis 
University School of Law.  This essay was prepared as part of the Symposium in Honor of 
the Work of Charles A. Sullivan.  I would like to thank Dean Kathleen Boozang, Professor 
Tim Glynn, Editor-in-Chief Tatiana Laing, and the editors of the Seton Hall Law Review for 
their excellent hosting of this event.  Thanks as well to the editors for their work on this 
essay.  And I am especially grateful for Charlie Sullivan’s work, support, and thoughtful 
commentary from the beginning of my career on into the future. 
 1  AB-5 Worker Status: Employees and Independent Contractors, CAL. LEGIS. INFO., 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB5 (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2020). 
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individually assumed by the particular parties.2 
Despite the importance of these statutory interventions, the reality 
remains that employment requires a contract to exist.3  As a result, the 
employment relationship is governed in part by the common law of 
contract—the collection of judicial decisions that together form the core of 
contract law.  Professor Charles Sullivan—the subject of this much-
deserved festschrift—has not forgotten the common law’s importance.  In a 
series of articles on contractual terms in employment agreements, Sullivan 
has dug into the landscape of common-law precedent and scholarship to 
unearth important understandings about the role of law in contract.  In this 
still relatively young century, Sullivan and Professor Rachel Arnow-
Richman4 have done the most to contribute to our understanding of contract 
law in the employment context.  As their scholarship reminds us, the 
employment contract is not a formality to be rushed past, but rather an 
important touchstone for both the parties and the community in setting the 
terms and expectations of the relationship. 
This essay takes contracts and contract law seriously in thinking about 
the nature of the employment relationship.  Part II considers the traditional 
debate between status and contract and depicts the debate as one between 
forms of communitarianism and libertarianism.  In Part III, I discuss 
Sullivan’s work on the employment contract and the role of common-law 
doctrine in the context of those contracts.  Sullivan highlights the 
 
 2  See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements 
and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 
379, 380 (2006) (noting that the employment relationship is “fundamentally contractual” but 
“is also constrained by employee rights and entitlements that are established by external 
law, that reflect public values and interests, and that typically cannot be varied or waived by 
contract”); Bryce Yoder, Note, How Reasonable Is “Reasonable”? The Search for a 
Satisfactory Approach to Employment Handbooks, 57 DUKE L.J. 1517, 1521 (2008) 
(arguing that “a strict contract-based analysis of the validity and interpretation of 
employment handbooks should be abandoned in favor of a common-sense approach that 
acknowledges the employment relationship as one of status”). 
 3  There are instances where a worker recovers in restitution, but in those cases either 
the worker was an employee who also had a contractual relationship, see, e.g., Britton v. 
Turner, 6 N.H. 481 (1834), or the worker was a quasi-volunteer who only performed 
because no contract could be created, see, e.g., Cotnam v. Wisdom, 104 S.W. 164 (Ark. 
1907). 
 4  Professor Arnow-Richman is one of Sullivan’s co-authors and also a presenter at this 
symposium.  For some examples of her scholarship on the role of contract in employment 
law, see Rachel Arnow-Richman, Modifying At-Will Employment Contracts, 57 B.C. L. 
REV. 427 (2016); Rachel Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law: The 
Common Law Case for Reasonable Notice of Termination, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1513 (2015); 
Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment at Will, 58 UCLA L. REV. 
1 (2010); Rachel Arnow-Richman, The Role of Contract in the Modern Employment 
Relationship, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1 (2003). 
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importance of contractual terms in his articles on clergy contracts, 
unenforceable terms, and contractual remedies.  Part IV compares 
Sullivan’s scholarship to the work of private-law scholars who have 
focused on the relations between individual contracting parties.  Like these 
private-law scholars, Sullivan highlights the importance of common law 
and the nuances of understanding that can arise from careful legal 
craftsmanship.  But Sullivan also reminds us that contract law is shaped by 
societal concerns, and that common-law judges have reflected public policy 
concerns in the doctrine.  Part V discusses one aspect of the common-law 
employment relationship that extends beyond private contract: namely, 
organizational rights.  The role of the worker within the organization is one 
aspect of the relationship that Sullivan, and many others, have in my view 
underappreciated, and I explain my perspective here.  The essay concludes 
in Part VI. 
II.  THE CONTESTED ROLE OF CONTRACT IN EMPLOYMENT 
Employment is both contractual and non-contractual.  On the one 
hand, the employment relationship requires a contract; without an 
agreement, there is no relationship.  A worker who offers her work without 
a promise or expectation of payment is a volunteer—not an employee.5  
The agreement may be implied-in-fact, but the worker must at least have an 
expectation of compensation for her labor to be as an employee.6  On the 
other hand, the employment relationship is determined by the nature of the 
relationship itself, rather than by the express terms of the agreement.  The 
two parties cannot mutually agree that an “employee” (as defined by 
factors set forth in a particular statute) is nevertheless not an employee.7 
This duality also represents competing perspectives on the normative 
framework for employment.  A contractual perspective on employment 
 
 5  RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.02 (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (“An individual is 
a volunteer and not an employee if the individual renders uncoerced services to a principal 
without being offered a material inducement.”).   
 6  California has developed a doctrine of implied-in-fact contract to rebut the state’s 
statutory presumption of at-will employment.  See Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 
1101 (Cal. 2000) (“The contractual understanding need not be express, but may be implied 
in fact, arising from the parties’ conduct evidencing their actual mutual intent to create such 
enforceable limitations.”); Julia Barnhart, The Implied-in-Fact Contract Exception to At-
Will Employment: A Call for Reform, 45 UCLA L. REV. 817, 819 (1998) (“Pursuant to this 
exception, a California employee can rebut her at-will status by showing the existence of an 
implied-in-fact contract with the employer such that the employee can be terminated only 
for good cause.”).  
 7  RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01 cmt. g (“The underlying economic 
realities of the employment relationship, rather than any designation or characterization of 
the relationship in an agreement or employer policy statement, determine whether a 
particular individual is an employee.”). 
BODIE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2020  2:59 PM 
1264 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1261 
focuses on the private ordering that leads to the agreement between the 
parties.  In order to enter a contract, both parties have to voluntarily agree 
to an exchange.8  The idea that contract is an extension of free will is 
supported by both moral theories and economic theories of the law.  
Contracts have been characterized as “essentially self-imposed” obligations 
undertaken through promise,9 as well as exchanges which will render both 
parties better off as a result.10  Based on these twin rationales, the law 
presumes that properly formed contracts should be enforced on their own 
terms.  This presumption applies to employment contracts as well.  As one 
prominent casebook in the field recognizes: “[i]n reality then, despite 
substantial federal regulation, the many aspects of the most important terms 
of the employment relationship—job security, wages, benefits—are left to 
private ordering between employers and employees.”11 
As originally conceived (or at least justified), the move to a 
contractual basis for the employment relationship freed workers from their 
status as “servants” under the law.  Under a status-based system, masters 
had the right to command servants based simply on their social position 
and not on negotiated agreements.12  The conception of employment as 
contractual was seen as liberating, since it gave employees the power to 
control their own destinies.13  This perspective developed as part of a 
general approach to the employment relationship as one of contract, rather 
than status.14  The Supreme Court during its much-maligned “Lochner Era” 
 
 8  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (defining a 
contract as “a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, 
or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty”). 
 9  CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 2 
(2d ed. 2015). 
 10  See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 115 (8th ed. 2011) (noting the 
“importance of voluntary exchanges in moving resources from less to more valuable uses”). 
 11  TIMOTHY P. GLYNN, RACHEL S. ARNOW-RICHMAN & CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, 
EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS xxvii (2d ed. 2011). 
 12  See CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR AND IDEOLOGY IN THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 
278–92 (1993). 
 13  See SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY 
HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 169–70 (14th ed. 1984) (1861) 
(“If then we employ Status, agreeably with the usage of the best writers, to signify these 
personal conditions only, and avoid applying the term to such conditions as are the 
immediate or remote result of agreement, we may say that the movement of the progressive 
societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.”); Aditi Bagchi, The Myth 
of Equality in the Employment Relation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 579, 598 (2009) (“Status is 
associated with unfreedom.  Not just the requirement of consent, but also its dispositive role 
in contract, guard against a rigid social order imposed from above.”). 
 14  MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
3 (7th ed. 2011) (“Traditionally, the law considered employment to be a matter of private 
contract between the employer and employee.”). 
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endeavored to preserve freedom of contract by striking down workplace 
regulation.15  Workers and employers should be free, concluded the Court, 
to arrive at their own arrangements without intervention from federal and 
state legislatures.16  Although the constitutional power of the Contracts 
Clause has significantly diminished, nevertheless there is still significant 
academic and judicial support for a primarily contractual approach to 
employment.17 
The modern status-based or regulatory approach to employment 
recognizes its contractual nature but believes in the necessity of guardrails 
on behalf of employees.  The New Deal began a steady march of statutory 
regimes that imposed minimum terms or legal mechanisms on the 
employment relationship: the National Labor Relations Act,18 the Fair 
Labor Standards Act,19 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,20 the Employee 
Retirement and Income Security Act,21 the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act,22 the Americans with Disabilities Act,23 and the Family and Medical 
Leave Act,24 to name the basics.  Accompanying these federal statutes are 
state laws that supplement or expand upon these protections.  Labor and 
employment laws restructure the employment relationship in myriad 
ways.25 
 
 15  See, e.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 559–62 (1923) (negating 
minimum wage law), overruled by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); 
Coppage v. Kansas, 235 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (rendering prohibitions against yellow-dog 
contracts invalid); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53–55 (1905) (striking down 
limitation on working hours). 
 16  See, e.g., Adkins, 261 U.S. at 545 (“Within this [contractual] liberty are contracts of 
employment of labor.  In making such contracts, generally speaking, the parties have an 
equal right to obtain from each other the best terms they can as the result of private 
bargaining.”); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174 (1908) (“The right of a person to 
sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of 
the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor from 
the person offering to sell it.”). 
 17  See GLYNN, ARNOW-RICHMAN & SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at xxviii (noting that “in 
recent decades there has been a retreat from mandates and a corresponding increased 
commitment to private ordering”); Richard A. Epstein, Contractual Solutions for 
Employment Law Problems, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 789 (2015).  Cf. DAVID E. 
BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST 
PROGRESSIVE REFORM 23 (2011) (defending the Lochner decision as a defense of small 
business and individual rights). 
 18  29 U.S.C. §§ 159–169 (2018). 
 19  Id. §§ 201–219. 
 20  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–17 (2018). 
 21  29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1381. 
 22  Id. §§ 651–678. 
 23  45 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2018). 
 24  29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654. 
 25  Orly Lobel, The Four Pillars of Work Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1539, 1539 (2006) 
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Supporters of regulation in the labor market—which would likely 
encompass most of the labor and employment academy—seek to justify 
these interventions, either each individually or together as an overall 
approach.26  Although it would be impossible to characterize the universe 
of justifications accurately and concisely, the most common approach 
focuses on the disparity in power between employers and employees.  Even 
assuming that private ordering might make sense for relatively equal 
economic actors, goes the argument, it does not make sense when 
individual workers are bargaining with large organizations over terms and 
conditions of work.  The bargaining is too unfair.27  If we just leave the 
parties to the market, employees will be taken advantage of, and possible 
third-party harms will result as well.28  Regulation is required to balance 
out the playing field and prevent opportunistic behavior.29 
These two normative frameworks—private ordering versus 
regulation—nudge their supporters to focus on these respective areas of 
law.  Private-ordering proponents spend more time on the law of contract, 
while interventionists tend to spend their time elucidating the interventions.  
In fact, many supporters of aggressive regulation have argued that contract 
law is not merely passive; it is instead actively enlisted to keep workers 
oppressed.  As Robert Gordon argued: 
“Freedom of contract” in practice was not a laissez[-]faire 
regime in which the parties were left at large to bargain out the 
content of their contracts.  It was rather a regime in which the 
 
(describing the four pillars of work law as “employment law, labor law, employment 
discrimination, and some variation of a tax-oriented employee-benefits law”). 
 26  See, e.g., Guy Davidov, The Three Axes of Employment Relationships: A 
Characterization of Workers in Need of Protection, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 357, 376 (2002) 
(defining employee vulnerabilities along three metrics: democratic deficits within the 
relationship, economic dependency, and social/psychological dependency). 
 27  Bagchi, supra note 13, at 580 (noting that the inequality between employees and 
employers is “multi-dimensional”). 
 28  Robert W. Gordon, Britton v. Turner: A Signpost on the Crooked Road to 
“Freedom” in the Employment Contract, in CONTRACTS STORIES 186, 225–26 (Douglas G. 
Baird ed., 2007) (“‘Freedom of contract’ is a slogan whose practical meaning is that the 
state should not—at least, not very visibly—change the constellation of rules so as to disturb 
the legal system’s status quo distribution of state power to coerce people through its award 
of rights to grant and withhold valuable resources, and its conferral of organization 
capacity.”). 
 29  See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Labor Law Reform Again? Reframing Labor Law as a 
Regulatory Project, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 383, 385 (2013) (“[W]e need to 
envision the regulation of work as one among many fields of regulation, alongside the 
regulation of consumer products, the environment, and financial integrity.  Reconceiving of 
labor law as a regulatory project brings into view an alternative set of analytical levers and 
tools of governance, as well as additional reservoirs of political support for the ultimate ends 
pursued by labor law.”). 
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legal system supplied implied terms largely favoring employers 
and in other ways threw its weight behind employers’ power to 
impose contract terms, backed up by the sanctions of dismissal 
and even (in some periods and situations) criminal prosecutions 
and injunctions.30 
In other words, contract law has been part of the problem—not merely an 
innocent bystander to the employer’s predations. 
Charlie Sullivan certainly does not shy away from regulatory 
interventions into the employment contract.31  But neither does he neglect 
the common law of contract or dismiss the contract itself.  Instead, he 
returns to these topics to probe more deeply into contract law’s treatment of 
the underlying fairness concerns driving the regulatory perspective.  The 
common law of contract does, in fact, have doctrines that protect workers 
against certain terms and conditions, and it does have a tradition of policing 
agreements for fairness.32  Moreover, Sullivan also recognizes the 
importance of contracts and contract terms to the parties and the courts.  
Because contracts matter, Sullivan takes them seriously on their own terms.  
The next section explores a few examples of how Sullivan’s scholarship 
drills down into the employment contract while not deferring to a private-
ordering perspective. 
III.  THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTRACTS IN EMPLOYMENT 
What if employers and employees could not form binding contracts?  
What if they could negotiate agreements, but those agreements were not 
enforceable in court?  This strange scenario may be in play when it comes 
to religious organizations and clergy.  In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC,33 the Supreme Court held that 
antidiscrimination laws did not apply to churches with respect to their 
clergy members—those who “preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and 
carry out their mission.”34  A church employee had brought an Americans 
with Disabilities Act claim with no specific connection to religious doctrine 
or practice; nevertheless, the Court held that religious organizations needed 
 
 30  Gordon, supra note 28, at 223. 
 31  See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan & Timothy P. Glynn, Horton Hatches the Egg: 
Concerted Action Includes Concerted Dispute Resolution, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1013, 1020 
(2013) (arguing that the NLRA prohibits class-action arbitration waivers); Charles A. 
Sullivan, Employing AI, 63 VILL. L. REV. 395, 428 (2018) (arguing for stronger 
antidiscrimination protections in the face of AI human-resources decision-making). 
 32  Bagchi, supra note 13, at 584 (“Numerous courts have observed a disparity in 
bargaining power between employers and employees, and many have justified pro-
employee defaults or interpretations on this basis.”). 
 33  565 U.S. 171 (2012). 
 34  Id. at 196. 
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an exemption from the statute in order to avoid unconstitutional 
entanglement with the free exercise of religion.35 
Since the Court exempted churches from claims under unrelated 
statutory employment protections, it seems to follow that any legal claim 
by a minister against the church would be barred, including common-law 
claims.  The Court, however, did not reach this question.36  In his article 
Clergy Contracts, Charlie Sullivan takes it up and argues that “a refusal to 
enforce contracts by churches can itself be seen as discriminatory against 
the church as an institution.”37  As Sullivan points out, “contract law 
remains the primary legal regulator of a vast and complex economy.”38  If 
churches were denied the ability to contract, that would render them 
“second-class citizens,” like minor children or the mentally incompetent.39  
Preventing churches from engaging in enforceable agreements might seem 
to benefit those institutions, but it also denies them the autonomy to make 
binding promises to their leaders, teachers, and celebrants.40  Churches 
could not credibly commit to terms and conditions of employment, and 
ministers would be less secure in the promises made and thus perhaps less 
likely to take a particular position.  Sullivan argues that such contracts 
should be enforceable if the underlying issue does not involve an 
interpretation of church doctrine.  He also argues that these agreements 
should include a dispute-resolution mechanism that would be better able to 
resolve ecclesiastical concerns than would a secular court.41 
It is important to note, I think, that Sullivan is not arguing for 
contractual enforceability simply to protect employee rights.  Rather, 
Sullivan recognizes that contract is an important mechanism in establishing 
the relationship between the parties.  Nullifying all such contracts would be 
“seriously problematic from the perspective of religious educational 
institutions generally and perhaps of any kind of religious institution that 
needs the security of contracts in order to structure its operations.”42  If the 
church can walk away from the contract at any time, it is not really a 
 
 35  Id. at 188 (“By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise 
Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through 
its appointments.”). 
 36  Id. at 196. 
 37  Charles A. Sullivan, Clergy Contracts, 22 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 371, 375 
(2018) [hereinafter Sullivan, Clergy Contracts]. 
 38  Sullivan, Clergy Contracts, supra note 37, at 399. 
 39  Sullivan, Clergy Contracts, supra note 37, at 399–400; see also id. at 375 (“Infants 
and incompetents are restricted in their ability to contract, thus rendering them less than full 
members of our society.”). 
 40  Sullivan, Clergy Contracts, supra note 37, at 393. 
 41  Sullivan, Clergy Contracts, supra note 37, at 406–07. 
 42  Sullivan, Clergy Contracts, supra note 37, at 406.  
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contract at all.43  While allowing that there is some value to purely 
hortatory documents, Sullivan nevertheless illuminates the problematic 
ramifications of the Supreme Court’s effort to separate religious institutions 
from secular law. 
Agreements sitting outside the scope of judicial protection are also 
considered in Sullivan’s The Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable 
Contract Terms.44  Certain categories of contract terms, such as liability 
waivers, noncompete clauses, and arbitration agreements, can be written so 
as to be unenforceable due to public policy or fairness concerns.  For 
example, covenants not to compete cannot be unreasonably overbroad by 
restricting employees for too long a time period or too wide a geographic 
region.  These clauses, however, still exist in “the wild” in real contracts 
applying to real people.  There may be a temptation to just ignore their 
existence, as courts will not enforce them, rendering them toothless.  But 
Sullivan takes this as a theoretical challenge: why might these clauses still 
find their way into contracts? 
Rather than harmless tchotchkes, Sullivan argues, these clauses do in 
fact have power.  They can act as a starting point in the judicial 
negotiation—a first offer that sets the bar.45  In addressing overbroad 
covenants not to compete as well as unbalanced arbitration agreements, 
courts often pare back the offending terms until they become reasonable.46  
The result is a no-lose situation for employers: either the clause is enforced 
as written, or the clause is rewritten to be enforceable.  Sullivan also notes 
that employees may make decisions based on the (naïve) view that the 
clauses do in fact apply to them.47  As a result, they may decide not to 
switch to another job or may fail to bring a claim under a seemingly unfair 
arbitration agreement.  The appropriate response to this opportunism would 
seem to be punishment, rather than accommodation, and courts have 
 
 43  Sullivan, Clergy Contracts, supra note 37, at 377. 
 44  Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable Contract Terms, 70 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1127 (2009) [hereinafter Sullivan, Puzzling Persistence]. 
 45  Sullivan, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 44, at 1147 (finding that “courts, while 
refusing to enforce the clause as written, typically enforce a cleaned-up version of it”).  
Extreme clauses can also have an anchoring effect on the parties, warping their sense of 
what would be fair.  Under anchoring and adjustment, “the first number with which a 
decision-maker is presented has a demonstrable effect on that person’s ultimate choice.  In 
essence, the first number heard becomes the place away from which any adjustment is 
made.”  Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Matthew T. Bodie, The Effects of Jury Ignorance 
About Damage Caps: The Case of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1361, 1378 
(2005); see also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the 
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 457–58 (1981) (finding anchoring effects even when 
participants know the number has been randomly generated). 
 46  Sullivan, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 44, at 1157. 
 47  Sullivan, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 44, at 1136, 1175, 1177. 
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refused to enforce the agreement at all if they found the clause was drafted 
and negotiated in bad faith.48  Sullivan, however, notes that a background 
norm of contract law may dampen this sanction.49  Courts generally try to 
follow the will of these parties so as to honor their private agreement.  This 
desire to hew as close as possible to the original bargain may drive courts 
to reform, rather than reject.50  Instead of cutting back on unenforceable 
clauses, Sullivan argues that common-law courts should generally refuse to 
enforce them at all, and only reform them if the deviation is “truly minor 
and unintentional.”51  Otherwise, the employer will be able to take 
advantage of both employees and the courts that do their modifications for 
them. 
Remedies are generally neglected in academic writing, as they cut 
across substantive subject areas and involve technical, somewhat mundane 
matters.  But Sullivan has an eye for the unexamined, as evidenced by his 
review of the Restatement of Employment Law’s chapter on remedies.52  
Contract remedies may seem straightforward in the employment context: 
employees get backpay, and employers get injunctions against employee 
competition.  As Sullivan explains, however, important details lurk beneath 
the surface.  Framing his inquiry under the usual standard for contractual 
expectation relief, Sullivan compares and contrasts the nuances of the 
doctrine to determine its overall balance as represented by the 
Restatement.53  Among his observations: both the Restatement and most 
courts permit injunctions against employees in too many cases;54 health 
care insurance is improperly left out of the Restatement’s consequential 
damages;55 and collateral sources such as unemployment compensation are 
not to be deducted from employee damages.56  Sullivan does a particularly 
 
 48  See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.08 (finding that a noncompete clause 
should not be modified if “the employer lacked a reasonable and good-faith basis for 
believing the covenant was enforceable”). 
 49  Sullivan, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 44, at 1170–74. 
 50  The psychological heuristic of anchoring may also play a role.  By setting forth the 
original (and unenforceable) version of the clause, the employer encourages the court to 
anchor from that version and then move away from it, rather than coming up with the best 
possible answer from scratch.  See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 45, at 457–58. 
 51  Sullivan, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 44, at 1176. 
 52  Charles A. Sullivan, Restating Employment Remedies, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1391 
(2015) [hereinafter Sullivan, Restating Employment Remedies]. 
 53 Sullivan, Restating Employment Remedies, supra note 52, at 1402 (“Traditional 
contracts doctrine generally vindicates the injured party’s expectation interest, which means 
giving her a sum that will put her in a position she would have occupied had the contract 
been performed.”). 
 54 Sullivan, Restating Employment Remedies, supra note 52, at 1394–98. 
 55 Sullivan, Restating Employment Remedies, supra note 52, at 1399–1400. 
 56 Sullivan, Restating Employment Remedies, supra note 52, at 1409. 
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detailed examination of mitigation, discussing how courts may fail to 
include various relevant factors, such as geographic location, reputational 
consequences, and the length of time elapsed.57  Overall, Sullivan 
concludes that that the Restatement reflects the pro-employer slant of 
common-law remedies, with some minor tweaks that may level the playing 
field a bit.58 
 
Sullivan’s careful exegesis of employment contract remedies reflects 
both his concern for employee welfare as well as his facility with minutiae.  
He judges the Restatement based on how employee-friendly it is, ultimately 
finding it a “mixed bag” on that score.59  At the same time, he engages with 
the Restatement point-by-point, often getting most animated with a 
particular illustration or an ambiguous doctrine.  He obviously cares about 
legal craftsmanship.  And he believes that even though the common law of 
contract is tilted towards employers, it is worth engaging with it, even if 
only to improve it incrementally.  To provide one example, Sullivan is 
perturbed at the Restatement’s solicitousness towards an obscure area of 
the law known as “lowered-sights” doctrine, which pertains to mitigation 
after a length of time.60 
These three articles illustrate Sullivan’s approach to contract and 
contract law.  He is not enamored with private ordering; he does not want 
to leave the parties to their own market-related devices.  Nevertheless, he 
takes contracts and contract law seriously, and he advocates for an 
approach that makes sense within the doctrine while acknowledging and 
adjusting for the bias against employees within the realm of private 
contract.  Critical to Sullivan’s approach is the recognition that the 
common law of contract takes the needs of society into account.  Sullivan 
has revived and illuminated the importance of contract law to third parties 
and society.  He recognizes that it is not simply private ordering. 
IV.  THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIETY IN CONTRACT LAW 
By taking contracts and contract law seriously, Charlie Sullivan shares 
intellectual commitments with the private-law theorists who do the same.  
 
 57 Sullivan, Restating Employment Remedies, supra note 52, at 1404–09. 
 58 Sullivan, Restating Employment Remedies, supra note 52, at 1420. 
 59  Id.; see also id. at 1392 (noting the “tension between, on the one hand, faithfully 
counting judicial noses and, on the other, adopting some better view—often as expounded in 
the law reviews and by a few courts who are more employee-friendly than most”). 
 60 Sullivan, Restating Employment Remedies, supra note 52, at 1407–08; see id. at 1408 
(“It would be preferable to simply continue with the current majority rule, which would 
apply the same standard to whether mitigation was required regardless of how much time 
passes.”). 
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Unlike the discipline of law and economics, which judges the law by its 
maximization of utility, private-law theorists can broadly be said to support 
the idea that “the purpose of private law is to be private law.”61  In other 
words, the law need not be a mere means to another end; the law can be an 
end unto itself.62  Such an appeal to formalism may seem hopelessly naïve 
after the barrage of critiques from legal realism, critical legal studies, and 
the aforementioned law and economics.  But the project of private-law 
theorists, particularly supporters of the New Private Law Theory, could be 
fairly characterized as a return to the importance of doctrine.63 
Sullivan, of course, does care about outcomes—he is consistently pro-
employee and advocates for rules that favor employees.  But more than 
most labor and employment academics, he also cares about doctrine.  This 
is his self-confessed interest.64  But it is also demonstrated in his articles 
and their conscientious attention to the specifics of doctrine.  In this way, 
he shares important methodological principles with private-law theorists, 
who are also known for their attention to doctrinal nuances.  This 
description of New Private Law could apply as well to Sullivan’s work: 
New Private Law theorists recognize the value of a pragmatism 
that is sensitive to which functions the law serves, critical as to 
how well it is serving those functions, and open-minded about 
how it might better serve them.  We insist, however, that 
understanding private law goes far beyond an appreciation of its 
salutary functions and its limits.  The task requires understanding 
the concepts and principles entrenched in the law and the 
structures, institutions, and languages that implement these 
concepts through the practices of courts, legislators, and 
lawyers.65 
Although, to my knowledge, Sullivan has not written on or in the New 
Private Law tradition, there would seem to be fruitful grounds for a 
 
 61  ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 5 (1995).  
 62  John Oberdiek, Method and Morality in the New Private Law of Torts, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 189, 190 (2012) (“To understand how to resolve a legal question, in short, 
formalism demands that we appeal to the law, not to some extralegal goal, whatever its 
merits are as a goal.”). 
 63  Id. (characterizing New Private Law as “self-consciously aspir[ing] to draw insight 
from both instrumentalism and formalism”). 
 64  Charles A. Sullivan, When Employee = Employer, JOTWELL (Feb. 10, 2011), 
https://worklaw.jotwell.com/when-employee-employer/ (“I admit to being old-fashioned 
enough to like well-done doctrinal articles.  Especially ones that upset conventional 
wisdom—the courts, the agencies, and the law reviews—by suggesting that, not to put too 
fine a point on it, everybody’s wrong.  Doctrinally.”). 
 65  Benjamin C. Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and Preemption, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 1757, 1757 (2012). 
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crossover.66  Private-law theorists have written on the importance of an 
“internal” perspective to common-law subjects, including contracts.67  The 
internal perspective refers to the idea that individuals are not all bad actors 
who seek to violate the law whenever rational to do so.  Instead, some 
people internalize the law and follow it because it is the law.68  Rebecca 
Stone has discussed how certain contract doctrines are best described as 
efforts to protect good-faith internalizers from the predations of rational 
and rule-breaking externalizers.  For example, in discussing the 
supercompensatory damages that are sometimes awarded in the context of 
willful breach, she states: “we should define a willful breach as one where 
the contract breaker acts for the wrong reasons under conditions in which 
the promisee is unlikely to be able to use the legal system to protect his 
expectation interest.”69  This idea matches up extremely well with Charlie’s 
concern about overbroad noncompete and arbitration agreements.70  In 
these situations, employers have written intentionally overbroad clauses 
that would not be enforced by courts; as Charlie emphasizes, employees 
may be “unaware of the fact and likely to remain unaware” that the clause 
is unenforceable.71  As a result, we have a situation analogous to the willful 
breach: one sides acts with the knowledge that the other side is unlikely to 
vindicate her rights.  In both of these situations, the lawbreaker should be 
punished, not just made to compensate, to discourage efforts to use contract 
 
 66  Sullivan has written about the importance of common law as part of the overall 
fabric of legal protections.  See Charles A. Sullivan, Is There a Madness to the Method?: 
Torts and Other Influences on Employment Discrimination Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1079, 
1079–80 (2014) (“The question before us is the influence of tort law on the interpretation of 
the anti-discrimination statutes, and I’ll spare the reader an historical exegesis that might 
lead us to conclude that it’s torts all the way down.  However maybe the broader point is 
that it’s law all the way down, and that our current system of categorizing legal doctrines 
into neat subject matters may be due more to our need to teach law students pieces of the so-
called seamless web than to any natural cleavages in intellectual discourse.”). 
 67  Andrew S. Gold, Internal and External Perspectives: On Methodology in the New 
Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF NEW PRIVATE LAW (Andrew S. Gold et al. eds., 
forthcoming 2020) (“If there is a common feature that cuts across New Private Law 
scholarship, it is an interest in the internal point of view.”), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pap 
ers.cfm?abstract_id=3379364; Rebecca Stone, Economic Analysis of Contract Law from the 
Internal Point of View, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 2005, 2008 (2016) (defining internalizers as 
“agents who adopt legal rules as reasons for action even when their self-interest (and other 
things they care about) dictates doing otherwise”). 
 68  Stephen A. Smith, The Normativity of Private Law, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 215 
(2011) (contending that legal duties themselves motivate individuals to follow the law); 
Stone, supra note 67, at 2007 (considering “the more realistic assumption that many legal 
subjects are motivated to conform to the law because it is the law”). 
 69  Stone, supra note 67, at 2043. 
 70  See Sullivan, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 44. 
 71  Sullivan, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 44, at 1136. 
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law opportunistically.72 
Overall, the New Private Law theorists have reverence for the 
traditions and complexities of the common law and respect for the practice 
of private citizens engaging with the law.73  Sullivan is, essentially, asking 
employers and courts to engage in the same practice.  If employers took 
seriously their normative duties to contract appropriately, employment 
contracts would better reflect the ideal bargain between the two parties.  
Instead, employers—on the advice of counsel, and with the tacit support of 
economists—have often acted like Holmes’ “bad man,” trying to get away 
with as much as they can.74  Sullivan and the New Private Law theorists 
would find common cause in supporting a more considered and attentive 
approach to common-law responsibilities on behalf of employers and their 
representatives.75 
There is one axis upon which Sullivan and the private-law theorists 
would have a sharp divide: the relationship between private law and public 
law—or, more broadly, between private law and society.  Private-law 
theorists bring their focus to the interactions between individuals to the 
 
 72  Cf. Nathan B. Oman, Consent to Retaliation: A Civil Recourse Theory of 
Contractual Liability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 529, 532 (2011) (“I label the core interpretive claim 
of this Article—that contractual liability consists of consent to retaliation in the event of 
breach—the civil recourse theory.”). 
 73  As John Goldberg has described it: 
The New Private Law is thus in part an effort to recapture the normative 
dimensions of private interactions (that is, interactions within civil society).  
In doing so, it rejects the supposition that the norms of private law reduce 
down to norms of public law.  It also rejects the contrary supposition that 
private interaction is a “Hobbesian” domain in which self-interest is given 
free rein, or in which persons interact atomistically.  Contracting, for 
example, is a distinctively normative practice.  It is governed by legal 
concepts that include, most basically, the idea of a bargained-for exchange 
(as opposed to a gift or a sham exchange) and good faith in performance.  
The basic challenge for courts in applying contract law is to determine in a 
given case the particular ways in which parties have or have not obligated 
themselves to one another, within the terms permitted by law. 
John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 
1661–62 (2012). 
 74  See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897) 
(“But what does [the notion of legal duty] mean to a bad man?  Mainly, and in the first 
place, a prophecy that if he does certain things he will be subjected to disagreeable 
consequences by way of imprisonment or compulsory payment of money.”); Stone, supra 
note 67, at 2007 (“The Holmesian ‘bad man’ view of the law that economists favor follows 
from a positive conception of legal subjects as agents who know what is best for themselves 
and single-mindedly pursue their own self-interest.”). 
 75  Nathan Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1484 
(2005) (discussing theories from Charles Fried and Stephen Smith that have offered “unified 
theories around the moral force of promising”). 
BODIE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/16/2020  2:59 PM 
2020] TAKING EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS SERIOUSLY 1275 
exclusion of government actors.76  Nate Oman and Jason Solomon provide 
the following description: “[w]hen invoking the term ‘private law,’ we . . . 
simply mean to refer to common-law subjects like torts, contract, and 
property (and their statutory counterparts) that involve primary rights by 
individuals that can be enforced by the rights-holders themselves against 
other individuals and entities.”77  By focusing on individual actors, private-
law theorists seek to strip out societal concerns and focus on dyadic 
interactions.  Private law emphasizes the autonomy of the person and the 
moral gravity of individual choices.78  It is important to note that this 
emphasis on private relationships cannot be equated with the commitment 
to private ordering in law and economics.  Private-law theory has largely 
rejected the calculus of utility maximization as the appropriate metric; 
instead, the moral dilemma of the choice is paramount.79  Despite these 
differences, however, both New Private Law and law and economics focus 
on the respect given to individual choices, and the need to enforce private 
agreements.80 
This focus on dyadic interactions, however, fails to represent the 
concern the common law has traditionally had for the societal ramifications 
of these individual interactions.  Courts have long been suspicious of 
liquidated damages, covenants not to compete, and arbitration agreements, 
even if mutually agreed upon; all of these are subject to reasonableness 
 
 76  Goldberg, supra note 73, at 1640 (“Private law defines the rights and duties of 
individuals and private entities as they relate to one another.  It stands in contrast to public 
law, which establishes the powers and responsibilities of governments, defines the rights 
and duties of individuals in relation to governments, and governs relations between and 
among nations.”). 
 77  Nathan B. Oman & Jason M. Solomon, The Supreme Court’s Theory of Private Law, 
62 DUKE L.J. 1109, 1111–12 (2013).   
 78  See, e.g., ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, PRIVATE WRONGS 6 (2016) (arguing that private law 
should be based on “the moral idea that no person is in charge of another”). 
 79  Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1725 
(2012) (“Conventionally it is thought that moral and philosophically oriented theories of 
property (and private law) are incompatible with law and economics and other related 
functional or consequentialist approaches.”); see also Seana Shiffrin, Could Breach of 
Contract Be Immoral?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1551, 1552 (2009) (finding that “there are 
occasions on which breach of contract is immoral because the contractual breach is a 
relevant instance of an immoral form of breach of promise”). 
 80  See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass, One-Legged Contracting, 133 HARV. L. REV. 
F. 1, 3–4 (2019), https://harvardlawreview.org/2019/11/one-legged-contracting/ (“A distinct- 
ive feature of contractual obligations is that they are both voluntary and chosen.  Contractual 
obligations are voluntary in the sense that the parties must agree to them, unlike most duties 
found in tort or criminal law.  Contractual obligations are chosen in the sense that the parties 
get to decide for themselves the content of the obligations.”); see also Steve Hedley, The 
Rise and Fall of Private Law Theory, 134 L. Q. REV. 214 (2018) (discussing both law and 
economics and moral theories of private law as overly attentive to individual relationships 
rather than societal concerns). 
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tests under the common law.81  Moreover, other default rules or 
presumptions build in public policy to standard doctrine.  The interpretive 
canon of contra proferentum—construing an ambiguous term against its 
drafter—incentivizes clarity but also helps the consumer in a boilerplate 
agreement.82  Throughout common law doctrines, courts have incorporated 
broader concerns about disparity in bargaining power83 and vindication of 
public policy.84  The common law frequently incorporates societal 
perspectives in its ecosystem of private rights and wrongs. 
The public orientation of many common-law doctrines can sometime 
be lost in the academic literature.  This predisposition is certainly rooted in 
history, as courts have repeatedly used common-law doctrines to restrict 
workers’ rights.85  The importance of broader social concerns within the 
private law, however, is never far from view in Sullivan’s scholarship on 
common-law doctrines.  He recognizes the traditions of equity and public 
policy that are still alive within the common law.  Although a great deal of 
his scholarship has centered around federal antidiscrimination statutes,86 
Sullivan has not glossed over the common law as a meaningful body of 
law.  Rather, he has focused on how the common law has been used and 
can be used to achieve societal ends, including the protection of employees. 
This focus on broader societal concerns is evident in Sullivan’s 
treatment of several contract doctrines in the context of employment.  In his 
treatment of covenants not to compete, Sullivan emphasizes the third-party 
harms from noncompete clauses that come not only from depressed hiring 
markets for employees but also restraint of trade and loss of productive 
work.87  Allowing employers to have the benefit of the doubt in rendering 
such clauses “reasonable” after the fact only adds to these societal 
 
 81  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (unconscionability), § 
356(1) (liquidated damages); RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §§ 8.05–08 (covenants 
not to compete). 
 82  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206.  This presumption has 
been applied against employers.  See, e.g., Jamesbury Corp. v. Worcester Valve Co., 443 
F.2d 205, 213 (1st Cir. 1971) (noting that any doubt over the definition of a term would be 
resolved against the employer, because the “agreement was a standard form contract drawn 
up by [the employer]” who “had superior bargaining power”). 
 83  See, e.g., Bagchi, supra note 13, at 586 (“In searching for a way to articulate the 
problem endemic in most employment relations, inequality of bargaining power is appealing 
because it would appear to speak to a defect recognizable on the terms of classical, formal 
contract theory.”). 
 84  RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §§ 5.01–03 (public policy tort). 
 85  See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MATTHEW T. BODIE, LABOR LAW 24–28 (1st ed. 2016). 
 86  See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, The Curious Incident of Gross and the Significance of 
Congress’s Failure to Bark, 90 TEX. L. REV. 157 (2012); Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly 
Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613 (2011). 
 87  See Sullivan, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 44, at 1151. 
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maladies.88  Moreover, in discussing the English phenomenon of “garden 
leave,” where employees are paid not to compete for a period of time, 
Sullivan admits that such contracts seem like a big step up from 
uncompensated noncompetition periods.89  And indeed, focusing merely on 
the employer-employee relationship, garden leave gives the employer its 
period of protection while providing the employee with wages and benefits.  
Sullivan, however, also recognizes the societal costs of competition 
restrictions, as well as the possibility that judges may be more likely to 
allow such restrictions when garden leave is included.  In his view, the 
overall assessment of garden leave is “a very complicated inquiry.”90 
 
Similarly, Sullivan has been a consistent skeptic of arbitration in the 
employment context.  In part, he has looked to statutory protections to 
restrain or nullify employer access to arbitration as a dispute-resolution 
forum.91  Although a private-ordering approach would look more 
receptively on the possibility of contractually created dispute resolution, 
Sullivan favors striking down these agreements when they have infringed 
upon workers’ rights to collective adjudications.92  Scholars have argued 
that the state has an obligation to intercede in these private agreements to 
protect access to justice.93  Sullivan supports this tradition and believes that 
these agreements have more to do with the lack of employee power than 
they do with the sanctity of moral engagements—or with Pareto-optimal 
decision-making.94  This concern with employer overreaching also has a 
tradition within the common law.95 
 
 88  Id. 
 89  Charles A. Sullivan, Tending the Garden: Restricting Competition Via “Garden 
Leave,” 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 293, 323–24 (2016). 
 90  Id. at 325. 
 91  Timothy P. Glynn & Charles A. Sullivan, Murphy Oil and Norris LaGuardia to the 
Rescue: Preserving Employee Rights to Concerted Dispute Resolution in an Era of 
Mandatory Individual Arbitration, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 401 (2018); Sullivan & Glynn, 
supra note 31. 
 92  See Glynn & Sullivan, supra note 91, at 414 (arguing that federal statutes protect 
employees’ right to collective dispute resolution). 
 93  See Margaret Jane Radin, The Fiduciary State and Private Ordering, in CONTRACT, 
STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 315, 315 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2016) 
(arguing that American “legal institutions are flouting their fiduciary obligation to the 
American people” by allowing the enforcement of arbitration clauses in consumer 
contracts). 
 94  See Sullivan & Glynn, supra note 31, at 1065 (discussing the employer’s interest in 
deterring employee suits). 
 95  See, e.g., Jamesbury Corp. v. Worcester Valve Co., 443 F.2d 205, 213 (1st Cir. 1971) 
(noting that any doubt over the definition of a term would be resolved against the employer, 
because the “agreement was a standard form contract drawn up by [the employer]” who 
“had superior bargaining power”); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 
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In making the point about Sullivan’s commitment to the public good, 
I may be drawing the lines too sharply.  Private-law theorists have 
recognized that “[a]lthough private law is concerned to address the 
interactions of individuals and entities, it does so as part of a political 
system in which government is the bearer of powers over, and duties owed 
to, those individuals and entities.”96  Nevertheless, Sullivan would 
undoubtedly agree with the sentiments of Steve Hedley’s concerns about 
power imbalances in contract: 
And if we truly seek to respect the rights of individuals, we 
cannot confine our attention to the two-party relationships 
favoured by corrective justice theorists.  It is all too probable that 
at least one of the parties will be a “repeat player,” who 
participates in these two-party relationships on a routine basis, 
and so acts in a manner very different from first-time players.  
Our theories of contract should therefore not neglect the 
possibility that one side will (say) produce a set of standard 
terms, and refuse to deal on any other basis, even though the 
other party lacks the time or the experience to comprehend those 
terms; asking whether any resulting agreement is one that the 
law should enforce is a very different question from those that 
corrective justice theorists ask.97 
There is one respect, however, in which I think Sullivan, private-law 
theorists, private-ordering supporters, and even the common law have all 
overlooked an important aspect of the employment relationship.  And that 
is in the organizational relationship between the employer and its 
employees. 
V.  THE ROLE OF ORGANIZATION IN CONTRACT AND EMPLOYMENT 
Employees do not work for themselves.  In the tautological definition 
provided by several federal statutes, an employee is “any individual 
employed by an employer.”98  It takes an employer to have an employee.99  
 
P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000) (“Given the lack of choice and the potential disadvantages that 
even a fair arbitration system can harbor for employees, we must be particularly attuned to 
claims that employers with superior bargaining power have imposed one-sided, 
substantively unconscionable terms as part of an arbitration agreement.”); Ravetto v. Triton 
Thalassic Techs., Inc., 941 A.2d 309, 325 (Conn. 2008) (“[B]ecause the employer generally 
enjoys superior bargaining power in the employment relationship, it is incumbent upon the 
employer to make any obligation for reimbursement explicit in the employment 
agreement.”).  
 96  Goldberg, supra note 73, at 1658. 
 97  Hedley, supra note 80, at 236.   
 98  See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (2018); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(f), 12111(4) (2018). 
 99  Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 661, 665 (2013) (“There can be no employee without an employer.”). 
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But unlike the traditional “masters” of yore, employers are almost never 
individuals; rather, they are economic firms.100  These firms have their 
representation in law as one of a number of forms of business associations, 
with the most common being the corporation.  Employees have 
traditionally not had governance representation within the business 
organization; corporate law, for example, provides that only shareholders 
have the right to elect directors.101  Nevertheless, in terms of the ongoing 
economic phenomenon that is a firm, employees have a critical role to play.  
In fact, Ronald Coase argued: “[w]e can best approach the question of what 
constitutes a firm in practice by considering the legal relationship normally 
called that of ‘master and servant’ or ‘employer and employee.’”102 
My view—elaborated at length elsewhere—is that employment law 
should really be organizational law.103  Rather than casting the employer as 
an entity separate from employees, we should consider employees an 
important part of the economic firms that employ them.  As participants in 
the firm, they are entitled to participation in governance as well.  
Governance rights would give employees more power to advocate for 
themselves within the firm and give them more negotiating power to 
improve their terms and conditions of employment.  Unfortunately, 
corporate law has effectively divorced employees from firm governance,104 
and employees are left with the right to collective representation under 
labor law as the closest approximation to governance power.105 
Recognizing this resulting power imbalance, employment law 
scholarship exists in a world of “us vs. them,” where employees are almost 
 
 100  Id.  
 101  Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and the Boundaries of the Corporation, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 86 (Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell eds., 
2012) [hereinafter Bodie, Boundaries of the Corporation]. 
 102  R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 403 (1937). 
 103  See, e.g., Bodie, Boundaries of the Corporation, supra note 101; Matthew T. Bodie, 
Employment as Fiduciary Relationship, 105 GEO. L.J. 819 (2017) [hereinafter Bodie, 
Employment as Fiduciary]. 
 104  Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate 
Law, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861, 1864 (2003) (exploring “how, in the course of the twentieth 
century, legal scholars and political theorists helped remove the interests of workers (as 
differentiated from shareholders, officers, and directors) from the core concerns of corporate 
law and theory”). 
 105  And the failings of collective bargaining to provide power to workers, at least since 
the mid-20th century, have been well documented.  See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification 
of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1528 (2002) (“The labor laws have 
failed to deliver an effective mechanism of workplace representation, and have become 
nearly irrelevant, to the vast majority of private sector American workers.”); Michael H. 
Gottesman, Wither Goest Labor Law: Law and Economics in the Workplace, 100 YALE L.J. 
2767, 2767–68 (1991). 
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always in need of protection against the predations of their employers.  
There is much truth in this picture.  But it ignores the fact that employees 
generally want to have jobs, generally want to participate in the life of their 
companies,106 and even want to have a cooperative relationship with 
management.107  Yes, autoworkers may rail against General Motors or Ford 
on the picket line; at the same time, GM workers are in competition with 
Ford workers and will benefit from GM’s success against Ford in the 
marketplace.  Coal workers understand better than anyone the dangerous 
conditions of mining and how companies can risk their lives to save 
money.  But coal workers also have largely stood up in support of the 
industry and have seen the Obama Administration’s harsh environmental 
regulations as a betrayal.108  So at least some aspects of employment-law 
scholarship should move beyond the oppositional employer-employee 
dichotomy and instead explore the role of employees within the 
organizations that employ them.109 
Charlie Sullivan’s work is unabashedly pro-employee and, as a 
corollary, anti-employer.  In his assessment of the Restatement of 
Employment Law, his metric is employee friendliness.110  He is skeptical of 
covenants not to compete and employment arbitration agreements; he 
worries that employers will use their manifold powers to take advantage of 
their workers.  These normative positions are fairly unremarkable in the 
labor and employment law academy and, given the subordinate state of 
employee power in our economy, justifiably so. 
Sullivan, however, has also recognized the role of organization in the 
employment relationship.  In his article on clerical contracts, he is 
frustrated by the likelihood that courts will not enforce such agreements at 
all.  Although such a result may help religious organizations facing a 
lawsuit, Sullivan notes that this species of paternalism will render churches 
and their employees worse off in the long run.111  In working through the 
 
 106  RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 4 (1999) (“American 
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 107  Id. at 5. 
 108  Matthew T. Bodie, Worker Participation, Sustainability, and the Puzzle of the 
Volkswagen Emissions Scandal, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW, 
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puzzle, Sullivan proposes an internal organizational resolution: namely, a 
form of ecclesiastical arbitration.112  While still advocating for judicial 
resolution of claims that do not relate to religious dogma, Sullivan notes 
that internal church dispute resolution has a long history and has even 
engendered an “ecclesiastical abstention” doctrine.113  An internal system 
of arbitration would allow courts to remain free of religious entanglement 
while ensuring that clerical contracts were not empty words. 
And in perhaps his deepest dive into the role of employees in 
organizational governance, Sullivan examined the scope of employee 
fiduciary duties and the potential for devastating damages for their 
violation.  In Mastering the Faithless Servant?: Reconciling Employment 
Law, Contract Law, and Fiduciary Duty, Sullivan argues that employees 
should not be susceptible to compensation forfeiture for relatively nominal 
or marginal breaches of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.114  Because of their 
relative power within the typical employer’s organizational governance, he 
argues, most employees should not be considered fiduciaries at all and 
instead should only have contractual duties.115  Rather, only higher-level 
employees should have fiduciary duties related to their positions within the 
firm’s hierarchy.116  Justifying those duties, Sullivan argues: “[a]lthough in 
theory even higher-level employees are subject to the control of the 
employer, typically a corporation’s board of directors, in practice the 
exercise of such control is likely to be weak or even nonexistent, a reality 
that has generated numerous proposals for reform of corporate 
governance.”117  But only these employees who are “effectively free from 
supervision” should have the responsibility of fiduciary duties owed to the 
organization.118 
I agree with Sullivan that employees’ responsibility to and for the 
organization should be the quantum for determining their fiduciary duties 
to that organization.119  And as a corollary, I believe that an employer 
should owe fiduciary duties to its employees when they cannot participate 
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in governance.120  More broadly, employment law should recognize that 
employees are part of their firms, care about their businesses, and generally 
want the overall enterprise to be successful.  Yes, opportunism is rampant.  
But employment law should focus on defusing that opportunism while not 
pitting employees and employers against one another in a cycle of eternal 
combat.  Employees deserve a role in governance. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Charlie Sullivan has taken employment contracts seriously.  In his 
exploration of contract terms and the common law doctrines that pertain to 
them, he has illuminated an area of legal research and practice that might 
otherwise have gone overlooked by the academy and bar.  His work in this 
area respects the nature of contractual obligation.  At the same time, he has 
carefully examined the layers of common-law precedent that represent 
societal responses to private-ordering problems.  I very much appreciate 
this work. 
Sullivan’s scholarship has greatly informed our understanding of the 
employment relationship and the common law that governs it.  He has 
given us new insights on the workings of, inter alia, clergy contracts, 
garden-leaves, non-enforceable terms, and duties of loyalty.  He roots for 
employees, but his scholarship finds ways of working within the grand 
tradition of the law and positioning it to best follow the path of justice.  
And in particular, I appreciate his sense of curiosity, novelty, and (good-
natured) contrariness.  While the crowd is rushing off to look at birds, he 
lifts up the stump to see the complicated ecosystem at work below the 
surface.121  And he does so with a glint in his eye, and a wave of his hand to 
come over—”Look what I’ve found!” 
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